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Effects of network trace sampling methods
on privacy and utility metrics
Phil Fazio, Keren Tan, and David Kotz
Dartmouth College
Abstract—Researchers choosing to share wireless-network
traces with colleagues must first anonymize sensitive information, trading off the removal of information in the interest of
identity protection and the preservation of useful data within the
trace. While several metrics exist to quantify this privacy-utility
tradeoff, they are often computationally expensive. Computing
these metrics using a sample of the trace could potentially
save precious time. In this paper, we examine several sampling
methods to discover their effects on measurement of the privacyutility tradeoff when anonymizing network traces. We tested the
relative accuracy of several packet and flow-sampling methods
on existing privacy and utility metrics. We concluded that, for
our test trace, no single sampling method we examined allowed
us to accurately measure the tradeoff, and that some sampling
methods can produce grossly inaccurate estimates of those values.
We call for further research to develop sampling methods that
maintain relevant privacy and utility properties.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Wireless-network researchers depend on the availability of
traffic traces collected from live production networks. It is
difficult to collect such traces, requiring permission from
network operators and installation of extensive infrastructure.
Due to this scarcity of data, it becomes extremely important
for the community of network researchers to share available
traces among several research projects; this has resulted in the
creation of data archive resources such as CRAWDAD [1].
Those that choose to share trace data with their colleagues
encounter the additional burden to remove or otherwise
anonymize sensitive information (e.g., identities of network
users or details of the network topology). This “sanitization”
naturally involves a tradeoff between the removal of information to fulfill privacy requirements and the preservation of
information that may be useful in later analysis. To streamline
the process of trace sanitization and to better analyze this
tradeoff, we proposed the NetSANI (Network Trace Sanitization and ANonymization Infrastructure) framework and
API [2]. Using either existing or user-defined metrics, the
framework is designed to allow the researcher to analyze an
anonymized trace to determine whether it meets pre-specified
privacy and utility goals. In computing the metrics, NetSANI
works with a sample of the collected trace with the goal
of saving precious time and resources when developing an
anonymization scheme.
Trace sampling is hardly a new concept; the benefits of
various sampling techniques have been analyzed with respect
to anomaly detection [3], [4], [5], [6], computation of traffic
flow statistics [7], [8], network management [9], and sample
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space efficiency [10]. However, little or no attention has been
paid to the effects of sampling when analyzing anonymized
network traces.
In this paper, we apply several well-known sampling methods to wireless-network traces and analyze their effect on some
existing privacy and utility metrics. By comparing these results
to the same analysis on the unsampled traces, we seek to
discover which sampling methods produce the most accurate
estimates of the tradeoff between privacy and utility and examine any trends in the experiments. We concluded that, for our
test trace, no single sampling method we examined allowed
us to accurately measure the tradeoff, and that some sampling
methods produce inaccurate estimates of those values.
In the following section, we test a few existing sampling
methods on an anonymized TCP/IP network trace to determine
their effect on analysis of the privacy/utility tradeoff on
that trace, and present the results of these experiments in
Section III. Finally, we discuss related and future work in
Section IV and conclude in Section V. Readers who wish to
review our sampling methods and metrics, or explore details
of our methods and results, may see Fazio’s thesis [11].
II. E XPERIMENTS
In this section, we present the results of our analysis of
the effects of several sampling methods on privacy metrics
and utility measurements on a wireless-network trace. This
trace was collected over a nine-hour over-night period on the
Dartmouth College campus wireless network in December
2003 and contains 1,651,553 IP packets with either TCP
or UDP headers. It was collected using 18 wireless sniffers
located in 14 buildings across campus.
A. Trace preparation
Prior to sampling the trace, we used the open-source
anontool [12] program to produce a sanitized version of our
trace. We configured anontool to use a prefix-preserving
mapping for IP addresses, a random one-to-one mapping
for port numbers, and hashing for the payload. With this
configuration, the number of packets and flows remained the
same in the raw and sanitized trace, and the distributions of
features remained constant, which allows us to measure the
changes incurred upon these distributions by the sampling
methods.
B. Sampling configuration
For this analysis, we implemented deterministic and uniform
random packet sampling, stratified packet sampling, determin-

istic and uniform random flow sampling, smart sampling, and
selective sampling. Details are available in Fazio [11].
To perform packet-based sampling on our traces in pcap
format, we used a custom Python wrapper for the C library
libpcap [13] to count the number of TCP and UDP packets
contained within the trace and collect field information as
necessary (e.g., src values when performing a stratified sample
on that field), performed the selected sampling method on the
input trace, and constructed a new pcap trace containing only
the packets selected for the sample.
For flow-based sampling, we used the tool tcptrace [14]
on default settings. We first constructed a list of the distinct
connections (flows) present within our packet trace, and determined the total number of TCP and UDP connections in
the trace. With the detailed output from tcptrace, we were
then able to collect the appropriate data needed about the trace
(e.g., each flow’s size in bytes, for smart sampling) – using
this data, we wrote a Python program to perform the selected
sampling method on the trace. Given the set of flows to be
included in the sample, we again used tcptrace to filter
the trace and determine the packets belonging to those flows;
as before, we then constructed a new pcap trace containing
the packets selected for the sample.
We chose parameters so that trends in privacy or utility
measurements could be best distinguished, with a secondary
goal that the sample trace sizes are roughly comparable
between sampling methods. While deterministic and random
sampling can decrease the sample size to 0, the opportunistic
sampling methods’ sample size converges towards a non-zero
value, making direct comparison difficult between individual
traces produced by differing sampling methods.
C. Metric configuration
We explored three privacy and one utility metrics; details
can be found in Fazio [11].
k-anonymity [15]. When calculating k-anonymity of the trace,
we consider one feature to be “sensitive” and the others to be
quasi-identifiers, leading to four cases:
Sensitive Field
src
dst
srcprt
dstprt

Quasi-identifiers
{dst, srcprt, dstprt}
{src, srcprt, dstprt}
{src, dst, dstprt}
{src, dst, srcprt}

L1-similarity [16]. The L1-similarity metric requires us to
define the network objects that are to be protected with
anonymity. Because we were using a packet trace the most
natural network object is a host. A host is a unique IP address
which is either a sender or receiver of data in the packet trace,
represented in either the src or prt features. In other words,
a host is either a sender or a receiver of data during the time
period in which the trace was collected.
Formally, each host object A consists of records from a trace
T with values on features F drawn from the set of fields above,
such that A = {t ∈ T | tsrc = h ∨ tdst = h}, where h is the IP
address for A. To measure the similarity between two objects,

we first calculate the distributions of distinct values on each
feature for the records contained within the host object.
We measured the L1-similarity between an unanonymized
host Ar and an anonymized host As . For each feature f ∈ F ,
we defined Arf and Asf as the distribution of distinct values
over f for each packet represented in Ar and As , respectively.
We then compared the distribution of distinct values in Arf
and Asf . Due to trace sanitization, these distinct values
cannot be compared directly (e.g., IP address “67.23.134.45”
anonymizes to “123.145.167.189”) and we were thus forced to
indirectly compare the distributions. We did this in our analysis
by considering the most frequently occurring value in Asf
to represent the most frequently occurring value in Arf , the
second most frequently values in Asf and to Arf to be the
same, and so on. The maximum value for sim(Arf , Asf ) is 2,
which indicates that the two objects have identical distributions
on the feature f , and it is likely that Ar = As [11].
Entropy anonymity degree (EAD) [17]. The EAD metric
requires one to define a probability mass function P r for a
given analysis. We implemented a function used by Coull
et al. [18] as a portion of their analysis to measure privacy
over several iterations of adversary deanonymization, defined
as follows:
sim(Arf , Asf )
.
(1)
P r(Arf = Asf ) = P
ar ∈AR ,as ∈AS sim(arf , asf )
where AR is the set of all hosts in the raw trace and AS is
the set of all hosts in the sanitized trace.
This definition of the probability mass function assigns the
highest masses where similarity between two objects is relatively high compared to the total similarity measured between
all pairs of objects. For example, let sim(Arf , Asf ) = 1.8;
if the average similarity between a raw object and sanitized
object is 0.5, P r(Arf = Asf ) would be much higher than if
the average similarity were 1.7.
We then calculated Shannon’s entropy on the set of values in
P r on each feature to calculate the EAD at the field level. At
the host level, the EAD is the sum of the field-level entropies;
to calculate the normalized EAD, whose value is between 0
and 1, we divided the field-level EAD and host-level EAD by
log2 |AS | and |F | log2 |AS |; |F | is the number of fields.
Snort [19]. To perform our experiments, we obtained the core
Snort Engine and installed it on our test machine. Because the
Snort intrusion-detection system depends on an updated set of
rules to test traces against, we updated our rules to the set
current as of 2011-04-27.
To collect alert logs, we then ran Snort with these rules
on each input sampled trace, filtering for alerts on IP packets
only but otherwise run on default settings. (Alerts generated by
packets with protocols other than TCP or UDP were present in
our log files; we discuss this effect when examining the results
of our analyses below. After collection, we used a script to
further parse and process these logs to obtain counts of each
unique alert type for our sampled traces. We then calculate a
utility metric by summing the number of alerts, weighted by
relative severity.

1.800
1.700
L1-similarity

In this subsection, we present the results of our experiments
on the sample traces described above.
a) L1-similarity and EAD: The potential resource benefits of sampling are clear upon examination of our chosen algorithm to calculate L1-similarity between raw and
anonymized objects. Because we compare each raw object to
each anonymized object, use of this metric requires O(n2 )
time and space; reducing the input size, even by a small
amount, would therefore result in tangible performance gains.
Due to our implementation of the L1-similarity metric as the
core for our EAD metric, we were able to directly examine
whether similarity values were changed by the sampling
process, and if so, whether entropy values based on that metric
were also affected.
Calculating these metrics on our original unsampled trace
served as a baseline by which we could compare the accuracy
of the same calculations when run on sampled raw and
sanitized traces; these baseline values are located in Table I.
Note that in this and all other L1-similarity calculations in
our experiments, the value listed represents the average of the
L1-similarity values across all sanitized objects.

Fig. 1. Relationship between number of distinct hosts in a sampled trace
and the corresponding L1-similarity of each feature.
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TABLE I
L1- SIMILARITY AND EAD FOR THE UNSAMPLED SANITIZED TRACE .

1.300
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Unique hosts
L1-similarity

EAD

src
1.5314
src
0.99530

1679
dst
srcprt
1.4925
0.9112
host: 1.3463
dst
srcprt
0.99513
0.97028
host: 0.98889

0

Sample size (distinct hosts)
dstprt
1.4503
dstprt
0.99486

These results indicate that, over the 1,679 unique hosts
located in the trace file, the average similarity of hosts across
the src and dst objects are roughly the same and that the
distributions of these similarities are also comparable; the
entropy values for both src and dst were approximately 0.995
in the unsampled trace. Lessened similarity and EAD in the
srcprt feature indicates an increased probability that a host
may be uniquely identified using external information about
srcprt distributions. Clients who send TCP requests over a
wide range of ports could be responsible for this result (as
opposed to external servers, which typically respond over wellknown ports). We may, therefore, consider the srcprt field to
be the “least private” field when measuring anonymity of hosts
in the unsampled trace.
Figure 1 presents the results of our calculations of the L1similarity of two features src,dst. We explored other features,
too, and larger plots are available in Fazio’s thesis [11].
We chose the number of distinct hosts as our x-axis in these
plots because they reveal a clear trend in similarity values for
all features as the sampled trace size decreases; L1-similarity
measurements become artificially high even at low sampling
rates and then begin to decrease again as the sample trace
size approaches 0. None of the sampling methods tested here
alters or mitigates this trend towards an overestimation of L1-

Unsampled
Packet-deterministic
Packet-uniform-random
Packet-stratified-src
Packet-stratified-srcprt
Flow-deterministic
Flow-random
Flow-selective-1
Flow-smart

similarity values. Were there an end-user who attempted trace
sampling in conjunction with an L1-similarity metric, that user
could be led to believe, in error, that the anonymized trace is
more secure than it actually is.
Relationships in similarity between features are also distorted (or lost entirely) in every sampling method tested. For
example, the similarity of field src is slightly greater than the
similarity of field dst in our non-sampled trace, but as the
sample size decreases, this situation quickly reverses itself.
Distortions such as this make developing an effective sanitization strategy more difficult, as they can alter the perception
of which fields are most insecure.
The results in Figure 1 are likely a result of the bias of
the sampling methods to select packets from larger “elephant”
flows and more prominent hosts in the trace – even selective
sampling fails to correct this bias; the resulting decreased
diversity in feature distributions would cause the similarity
values to increase. As sample size approaches zero, similarity
values are much more varied and scattered – especially when

the dataset is enough to make k = 1 for the entire field.
The sole use of k-anonymity as a privacy metric is difficult,
however, due to the inability to identify sensitive attributes
with certainty. In our experiments, we attempted to judge each
field as sensitive, using the other three tested fields as quasiidentifiers, as described in Section II-C, with mixed results.
While an increase in k-anonymity in one of our samples, such
that k > 1, would indicate an inaccurate value that could give
a researcher a false sense of security, we did not see this result
in any of the sampled traces on any field.
c) Snort alerts: Our investigation of the effects of sampling on intrusion and anomaly detection was similarly difficult because of the tendency of sampling to reduce substantially the number of alerts that Snort detects, which adversely
affects the ability to accurately predict the utility of the
whole trace. A summary of the 2068 alerts triggered by the
unsampled trace is contained in Table II.
TABLE II
S NORT ALERTS FROM THE UNSAMPLED TRACE .

Fig. 2. Relationship between number of distinct hosts in a sampled trace
and the corresponding EAD of each feature.

using flow-sampling methods. This variation is due to the fact
that as the sampled trace shrinks, the removal of additional
packets or flows could just as easily increase the similarity
(as the sample becomes relatively more homogeneous) or decrease it (if the sample becomes less saturated with dominant
“elephant”-sized flows).
Figure 2 shows the calculation of entropy anonymity degree
using the same input traces and our similarity metric from
Figure 1 at its core. (We explore more fields in [11]; for most
fields the behavior of anonymity calculations is similar.) As
the sample size (measured in distinct network hosts) shrinks,
entropy calculations remain at or slightly above the accurate
value. When the sample size decreases beneath approximately
800 distinct hosts, or about half the unsampled trace size,
entropy begins to decrease across the board, with this decrease
accelerating as the sample size approaches zero.
Entropy decreases when fewer network hosts are present in
the sample because the unanonymized and anonymized objects
are more easily placed in a one-to-one mapping than may have
occurred in a larger sample set; each sanitized object is more
likely to have a unique distribution of features that can be
matched with an equivalent unsanitized object, whereas in a
larger trace, there may be several unanonymized objects with
a similar distribution of features.
b) k-anonymity: The effects of sampling on k-anonymity
are less clear, however, due to the fact that k for the sanitized
trace is equal to 1 on all fields. This is to be expected, as our
sanitization configuration did not involve the truncation of any
data. By not truncating data, we do not make any alterations
to the equivalence classes present in the unsanitized trace, and
the presence of just one quasi-identifier with one instance in

Alert type
ICMP unreachable host
ICMP unreachable port
ICMP ping
TCP reset
TCP window close
total
utility
utility (without ICMP included)

Frequency
1
206
285
1012
564
2068
568.4
371.6

Fully half of our sample traces (129 of 257) failed to
trigger any Snort alerts, while those that did trigger alerts only
triggered a small fraction of the utility total on its own; the
results are plotted in Figure 3. While the overall utility of
the sanitized trace was measured by Snort to be 568.4, this
figure includes ICMP packets that were filtered out in all of
the sampling processes – the sans-ICMP utility measure of the
unsampled anonymized trace was thus 371.6.
Only when using smart sampling, whose sample sizes
all contained greater than 1200 unique hosts, were utility
measurements somewhat reliable and followed a basic trend,
decreasing sharply in a somewhat-linear fashion until reaching
the smallest smart sample (z = 9503, 1231 unique hosts,
utility = 0.46). When sample size shrinks further, alert generation becomes hit-or-miss regardless of sampling method –
because different random samples can behave differently at
the same parameter settings – with no sample registering a
utility of greater than 11.4 (which occurred with deterministic
flow sampling, n = 211). Because of the unreliability (or
total lack) of alert counts, it is difficult to conclude that
any particular sampling method outperforms another. With the
possible exception of smart sampling, none of the sampling
methods tested would have allowed an accurate measurement
of utility; all would have severely underestimated the utility
of the trace, as defined by our metric.
E. Limitations
The tests and measurements that we performed were conducted on a single, relatively small (200MB) trace, which pre-
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Fig. 3. Relationship between sample size (in distinct hosts) and the utility
measured by Snort alerts.

cludes us from making broad-reaching conclusions about the
applicability of trace sampling to measure the privacy-utility
tradeoff in most circumstances or use cases. Nonetheless, the
results show that sampling often has a substantial impact on
the privacy and utility metrics we studied, and that conclusion
is likely to occur for larger traces. Because only TCP and
UDP headers were examined in our experiments, there may
be other types of records or protocols that are more amenable
to sampling. Finally, our experiments themselves may not
provide a comprehensive summary of sampling methods to
measure privacy and utility, as we have focused on a small
number of distinct metrics and did not test any adaptive
sampling methods, which may or may not outperform the
conventional methods tested here.
III. D ISCUSSION
For the trace used in performing the above analyses, it is
apparent that none of the sampling methods tested would have
yielded accurate information about the privacy and utility of
the sanitized trace that could aid a researcher in the task of
releasing a network trace to the community. This result does
not rule out the ability of trace sampling to allow an accurate
estimation of the privacy-utility tradeoff, as the trace used
for these experiments was relatively small and the sampling
methods used here may differ in behavior on larger or more
diverse traces.
But these results suggest that either additional research
into new sampling algorithms is needed, or that it may be
inappropriate to pursue a one-size-fits-all approach to sampling
traces when measuring the privacy-utility tradeoff without a
more intimate knowledge of the metrics being used to measure
that tradeoff.
Metrics relying on entropy, such as entropy anonymity degree, seemed more able to absorb the changes in successivelysmaller sampled traces and produce somewhat accurate mea-

surements despite the noted changes in the L1-similarity
metric values that EAD was itself based on. Attempts to distill
EAD values for individual features down to a single per-host
privacy value could be misleading, however, as the behavior
of one field (srcprt) largely defines the EAD for the entire
host object in our experiments.
Because flow-based sampling did not definitively outperform packet-based sampling in any of our experiments, and
given its increased resource requirements, it would be difficult
to recommend its use over packet-based sampling based on
these results. Were we to recommend a sampling strategy
for the trace tested in our experiments, a potential sampling
strategy to yield minor performance gains without significant
loss of accuracy could include:
1) limited deterministic (sample rate ≈ 2) packet sampling
to perform L1-similarity and EAD tests at a feature level,
as they are the most performance-intense metrics and
least susceptible to disturbance by sampling,
2) measuring k-anonymity without sampling, as the results
(while somewhat unhelpful in this case) are relatively
easy to calculate and equivalence class sizes degrade
quickly with even limited sampling, and
3) measuring utility using Snort without sampling, as any
sampling can seriously affect the number of alerts triggered (and thus the inferred utility).
IV. R ELATED AND FUTURE WORK
Related work on packet sampling and its effects on network
traffic characterization was conducted by Claffy et al. [7] and
Hernandez et al. [9], the latter introducing adaptive methods
to equal or outperform non-adaptive packet sampling while
reducing hardware or storage requirements to collect the
relevant traces.
Brauckhoff et al. [4] specifically examined the impact of
packet sampling on flow statistics and the ability to detect
the Blaster worm by examining changes in entropy. Mai
et al. [5], [6] demonstrated the ability to detect a range
of anomalies using a number of packet and flow-sampling
methods, and Androulidakis et al. [3] used flow-sampling
methods to specifically target anomalies dependent on changes
in entropy across fields. Tune and Veitch [20] examined the
relative benefits of using sampling and sketching techniques
to measure flow size distributions.
Kelly et al. [16] gathered a list of existing privacy metrics,
including metrics based on information entropy described
by Diaz et al. [17]. Coull et al. [18], [21] examined the
sensitive information that can be inferred from traces, methods
to measure privacy using a combination of entropy and L1similarity of feature distributions, and described an iterative
strategy to simulate an adversary’s attempt to deanonymize
data using externally available information.
Lakkaraju and Slagell [22] examined the use of Snort to
measure utility of a network trace. Research from Pang et
al. [23] and Slagell and Yurcik [24] discuss the inherent tradeoff between privacy and utility when sanitizing network traces.
Finally, Fazio et al. [2] outlined a framework to streamline

the process of sanitizing traces for researchers looking to best
address this tradeoff.
To the best of our knowledge, however, there is no existing
work that measures the effect of packet sampling (or flow
sampling) on the simultaneous measurement of privacy and
utility of a network trace, the so-called privacy-utility tradeoff.
Additionally, this work treats trace sampling as one of a series
of steps to best utilize the resources of a researcher seeking
to anonymize and release a network trace with the specific
goal of allowing colleagues to conduct useful research on the
anonymized traces.
Future directions in work related to sampling and its effect
on measuring the privacy-utility tradeoff in network traces
include research towards more generally effective sampling
methods, and their specific effects on privacy and utility
metrics, and the ability to accurately “correct” measurements
using sampled traces to their unsampled equivalents. More
rigorous mathematical casting of the privacy-utility tradeoff
could lead to increased usage of formal methods to determine
a representative subset of the trace, leading to metric calculations substantially similar to the same metrics calculated over
the original trace. Finally, future research could also examine
multi-stage sampling methods, or processes that combine one
or more distinct sampling methods based on context, and their
effects on privacy and utility compared to using a broadlyapplicable sampling method.
V. S UMMARY
In this paper, we examine several simple non-adaptive sampling methods to discover their effects on measurement of the
privacy-utility tradeoff when sanitizing network traces prior to
their sharing or publication. The results will be applied to the
recently-introduced NetSANI framework for trace sanitization
that seeks to ease the burden on researchers to adequately
sanitize their network traces (while preserving useful data)
and share them with their colleagues. While packet and flow
sampling have been used and analyzed in the past for such
applications as anomaly detection and traffic measurement,
little or no research has been done to sampling’s direct effect
on measuring both privacy and utility at the same time.
After sanitizing a small sample trace collected from the
Dartmouth College wireless network, we tested the relative
accuracy of a variety of previously-implemented packet and
flow-sampling methods when measuring privacy with microdata, similarity, and entropy-based metrics, and on utility by
use of the Snort intrusion-detection system. The results of this
analysis led us to conclude that, for the test trace, no single
sampling method we examined was able to accurately measure
privacy and utility, and that some sampling methods can
produce grossly inaccurate estimates of those values. We also
found it unlikely that a single “universal” sampling method
could be used to perform this analysis accurately on a trace of
any size. We were unable to draw conclusions on the use of
packet versus flow sampling in these instances, nor were we
able to gauge the accuracy of experiments on larger traces.
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A PPENDIX
There are two types of metrics used in the analysis of
network traces: privacy metrics, which measure the degree
to which a sanitization method fulfills its predetermined requirements, and utility metrics, which measure the usefulness
of data preserved after the sanitization of a trace.
A. Privacy metrics
A privacy metric (also known as an anonymity metric),
is defined by Kelly et al. [16] as a quantification of how
well an anonymization strategy hides the identity of sensitive
information or users against a particular attack.
Individual privacy metrics may be sensitive to the underlying types or structure of the dataset to be analyzed or may
be generic enough to apply to a wider range of data formats.
In our work, we classify anonymity metrics into two broad
models: those that are microdata-based and those that are
network-based. Microdata-based metrics assume the dataset
is organized like a relational database in which certain fields
may be designated as “sensitive” a priori; network-based
metrics use statistical and probabilistic information about the
dataset to simulate an adversary’s knowledge. The NetSANI
framework [2] is designed to accommodate both models, and
our experiments here use examples of both types of metrics.
a) k-anonymity: We begin with a well-known and simple
microdata-based metric, k-anonymity [15]. When preparing to
release a dataset that contains fields known to contain “sensitive” information, we must recognize that the adversary may
use some non-sensitive fields in conjunction with externally
available information to identify sensitive data; this set of
attributes are called quasi-identifiers [15]. An adversary may
have external information that maps quasi-identifiers to actual
identities, and thus may be able (with the released dataset) to
map identities to sensitive values. The microdata-based metric
of k-anonymity states that for each combination of values of
quasi-identifiers, that combination can be matched to at least
k identities.
The dataset presented in Table III is an example of an
anonymized dataset that achieves 2-anonymity with the set

TABLE III
S AMPLE DATASET FOR A SEARCH - ENGINE LOG ANONYMIZED FOR
2- ANONYMITY IS ACHIEVED [16].
IP address
96.234.69.*
96.234.69.*
222.154.155.***
222.154.155.***
96.234.68.2*
96.234.68.2*
96.234.68.2*
96.234.68.2*
129.170.111.1**
129.170.111.1**

Date
2008-10-2*
2008-10-2*
2008-10-**
2008-10-**
2008-10-**
2008-10-**
2008-10-**
2008-10-**
2008-10-2*
2008-10-2*

Time
234*
234*
23**
23**
23**
23**
23**
23**
235*
235*

Query
AIDS medicine
AIDS medicine
m-invariant
l-diversity
cook book
skin rash
filling station
winter coats
tan salon
mcdonalds jobs

TABLE IV
k- ANONYMITY PRIVACY METRIC [16].
Privacy level
Preserved
Degraded
Eliminated

Metric level = z
k≥z
k<z
k=1

of sensitive attributes S = query. This means that for each
individual record in the dataset, there exist at least 2 instances
of a single quasi-identifier Q = ip, date, time that could be
associated with that record’s sensitive value. In our sample
dataset, this means that the sensitive query of “skin rash” could
have originated from at least 2 records with the quasi-identifier
(96.234.68.2*, 2008-10-**, 23**).
k-anonymity is quite limited in its scope, and does not
attempt to measure the variety of sensitive values associated
with each quasi-identifier; for instance, all records within
the quasi-identifier (96.234.69.**, 2008-10-2*, 234*) in the
sample dataset can be associated with the sensitive query
“AIDS medicine”. Additional microdata-type metrics such as
l-diversity and t-closeness attempt to address this and other
shortcomings [16].
We can define k-anonymity as a simple ternary privacy
metric, as shown in Table IV; it measures privacy at three
levels: preserved, degraded, or eliminated. By specifying a
threshold value z, we measure whether the network trace is kanonymous such that k ≥ z. If so, then privacy is considered
to be preserved; else privacy is considered degraded, or in the
case of k = 1, eliminated [16].
b) L1-similarity: Prior to introducing the next metric, we
introduce the concept of a network object [18], [2]. A network
object is an entity whose identity a trace publisher seeks to
protect and/or retain utility, such as a host, subnet, or web
page. It is important to note that an object may be defined by
more than one record in a trace (multiple packets may be from
the same host); the converse holds, as a record may belong
to one or more network objects (for example, a TCP packet
refers to both the src host and the dst host).
L1-similarity [16] estimates the anonymity of an object by
computing a distance between the distribution of values of
an anonymized object X and the distribution of values of an

TABLE VI
EAD PRIVACY METRIC [16].

TABLE V
L1- SIMILARITY ANONYMITY METRIC [16].
Privacy level
Preserved
Degraded
Eliminated

Metric level = sim(X, Y )
sim(X, Y ) = 2
0 < sim(X, Y ) < 2
sim(X, Y ) ≈ 0

unanonymized object Y , defined as
X
|P (X = z) − P (y = z)|.
sim(X, Y ) = 2 −

Privacy level
Preserved
Degraded
Eliminated

(2)

z∈X∪Y

The maximum value of sim(X, Y ) is 2, which represents
an identical distribution of features between the two objects.
This notion is somewhat counterintuitive, representing the
maximum preservation of anonymity because an attacker fails
to gain additional knowledge from the anonymized dataset.
Conversely, if the distributions of the two objects are totally
disjoint, the similarity is 0, and the attacker gains “complete
or substantial knowledge of identities and relationships” [16].
This metric is summarized in Table V.
c) Entropy anonymity degree (EAD): Consider a situation of an adversary attempting to discern the author of each of
several messages sent across a network. The adversary knows
the set of all the possible authors, but at the onset, it appears
equally likely that any author may have sent a given message.
However, upon learning additional information, such as how
prolific each author is, the adversary is able to guess with more
certainty which author may have written a given message. The
metric of entropy anonymity degree uses entropy to measure
how much information the adversary has gained, and thus, the
degree of anonymity that the author of a message retains after
the attack [17].
Mathematically, let I be the set of distinct values that are
represented in a probability distribution X; in this case, each
i ∈ I represents an author ai in the set of all possible authors
A. Let pi represent the probability that ai is responsible for
a message. Therefore, pi = P r(X = i), where P r is a
probability mass function.
The entropy of this probability distribution is defined as
follows, where N is the size of the sample space [18], [17]:
H(X) = −

N
X

pi log2 (pi )

(3)

i=1

Entropy anonymity degree (noted Dr ) normalizes the result
of H(X) above, dividing it by the maximum entropy Hmax =
log2 N of the system:
Dr =

H(X)
,
Hmax

(4)

where 0 ≤ Dr ≤ 1 [25].
Logically, the maximum degree of anonymity is achieved
when the attacker finds it equally likely that any author is
responsible for sending a given message; likewise, anonymity
has been eliminated when the attacker is certain or near-certain
of the author of that message. This may be represented in
an anonymity metric as follows (summarized in Table VI):

Metric level = Dr
Dr = 1
0 ≤ Dr < 1
Dr ≈ 0

when Dr = 1, all values across the attribute are equally
likely, and privacy is fully preserved. As Dr decreases, privacy
becomes increasingly degraded until, when Dr = 0, privacy
is considered fully eliminated.
Note that the value of EAD, Dr , is specific to the probability
mass function P r of the sample space X, which is dependent
on the type of information the attacker possesses.
B. Utility metrics
Quantified measurement of utility is difficult, because those
looking to use trace data (researchers) often have specific
use cases. Therefore, unlike the privacy metrics, developing
an overarching utility metric is a much more challenging
endeavor [26]. Almost all metrics to date center on the concept
of anomaly detection as a measure of utility, because often
the search for anomalous traffic (e.g., DoS attack, portscan)
requires a wide range of useful data from the trace. For
example, several important anomalies may be mined from
examining the entropy of traffic features [3], [27]:
• DDoS attack: a distributed denial of service attack
attempts to target a service to make its resources unavailable to others; it may come from many sources.
Fields affected: large decrease in H for dst and dstprt.
• Portscan: in a portscan attack, a single sender sends
packets to a host over a wide range of ports, with the
intent to identify services available at the host.
Fields affected: large decrease in H for src, dst, and
srcprt, slight increase in H for dstprt, and slight decrease in H for Fx , the flow size.
• Worm propagation: a program that replicates itself in
an attempt to exploit and infect other machines.
Fields affected: large decrease in H for src and dstprt,
slight increase for dst and srcprt, and slight decrease in
H for Fx .
While it is possible to implement separate metrics measuring detection of the attacks above, the open-source intrusiondetection tool Snort [19] contains the tools necessary to determine the type and extent of a wide range of anomalies during
either live packet capture or post-capture analysis [22, for
example]. Because Snort contains rules designed to discover
instances of all three attacks described above, we assign a
weight 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 to each alert based on the number and
severity of alerts when running a TCP/UDP network trace
through the intrusion-detection tool; alerts with higher severity
or lower frequency are assigned higher utility value.
Because a trace theoretically has no measurable utility limit,
we compare the values of the utility metric of the raw trace
against the same analysis run on the sanitized trace.

